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A Continuum Theory for
Social Work Knowledge
YAIR CASPI
Hadassah Medical Organization
Jerusalem, Israel
Department of Psychiatry
Relativist approaches, to knowledge, suggested by some social workers as
alternative to the predominant scientific logical positivistic approaches
to knowledge, suffer from serious flaws. Between the poles of objectivism
and relativism exists a third and more useful approach to knowledge in
social work. This approach is presented and developed based on recent
sources from the philosophy of knowledge, the philosophy of science,
and metatheoretical developments in the social sciences. A continuum
theory of knowledge, between objectivism and relativism, is suggested
for social work. The continuum theory narrows the gap between research
and practice and between the scientific side and the artistic and value
laden aspects of social work.
The dichotomy between research and practice, and the sci-
entific side and artistic and value laden side of social work,
thought by some to have been caused by the introduction of
positivistic science into social work, led some writers to adopt
relativism as an alternative approach to knowledge. (See, for
examples of relativism in social work, Boehm, 1961; Vigilante,
et al, 1981, 1982; Brunswick Heineman, 1981; Goldstein, 1982,
1986; Haworth, 1984; Hofstein, 1964). This paper demonstrates
that relativism is a weak and insufficient alternative to logical
positivism and the objectivist tradition. A study of the criticism
of logical positivism in the philosophy of knowledge, philoso-
phy of science, and metatheoretical developments in the social
sciences, suggests a third approach - between objectivism and
relativism. This approach is presented and developed and its
implications for social work are examined.
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The Limits of Relativism
The main idea of relativism was first expressed by Protago-
ras, the Greek philosopher, in the fourth century B.C.: man is
the measure of all things. Just as what tastes good for one, Pro-
tagoras said, is not tasty to another, so what is true for one is
not necessarily true for another. Protagoras limited the value of
all affirmation to the one who makes it (Gallagher, 1982, p. 11).
The relativist sees the objectivist as mistaking what is at best
historically or culturally stable for the eternal and permanent.
Bernstein (1983, p. 8) says:
In its strongest form, relativism is the basic conviction that when
we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers
have taken to be the most fundamental, whether it is the concept
of rationality, truth, reality, right, the good, or norms - we are
forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts
must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme,
theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society or culture.
Today relativism is supported by conclusions drawn from
research in the history of science. Some historians of science con-
tend that the history of science does not demonstrate a cumu-
lative character of theories. Major scientific theories have been
replaced in the history of science and many abandoned theories
left little of themselves behind. Kuhn (1970, pp. 121-149) sees,
in the systems of Aristotle, Newton and Einstein, no coherent
direction of ontological development. He sees major steps in sci-
entific progress as involving paradigm shifts - replacement of
the whole conceptual framework used by the former paradigm.
To Kuhn, competing paradigms lack a basis of comparison. They
reflect divergent conceptual orientations. Proponents of com-
peting paradigms see the same types of phenomena in entirely
different ways.
The idea that major concepts of today's scientific theories
will be replaced by entirely different concepts presented in the
scientific theory of tomorrow, challenges the ability of these con-
cepts to refer consistently to reality. Concepts are seen by rel-
ativists as temporary tools, relative to a time and culture. The
many concepts which have been used by science to describe
the same phenomena may be said to represent many private
relative experiences (Lauden, 1984, pp. 218-249).
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Current relativist theory emphasizes private subjective ex-
perience as the source for rationality. Relativists say that what
we call rational ideas fit our preferred, basic intuitions about re-
ality (Lauden, 1977, p. 161). We may have the notion that these
ideas are universal because they are accepted by most of the
scientific community, but even if this is so, the ideas represent
just another private experience - the consensus that was at-
tainable by one group of scientists, members of one community
in a certain time.
Social workers, such as Hofstein (1964, p. 46), influenced by
this relativistic philosophy, have called upon us to abandon cer-
tainty "either in actuality or as a goal toward which to strive".
Heineman-Pieper (1985, p. 4) suggested giving up certainty as a
goal for knowledge in social work. She wrote that "the attempt
to recognize and allow for bias is of much greater value than the
attempt to eradicate it". Social workers who accept a relativis-
tic barrier to knowledge focus on attempts to find situational
knowledge rather than to pursue universal laws. Without the
ability to achieve some certainty to lean on,
methods of data collection are to be chosen not by the application
of judgmental criteria, but for their applicability to a particular
problem or for their ability to provide a different slant on a given
problem. (Heineman-Pieper, 1985, p. 8)
Heineman-Pieper's relativism leads to a focus on the private
subjective experience. The unique becomes more important than
the common.
From an objectivist point of view relativists might be seen as
prisoners of their subjective experience, unable to communicate
their knowledge and experience to people who have different
subjective experiences. The relativist sees no problem here. From
a relativistic perspective, knowledge is not something people
possess somewhere in their heads, but rather, something people
do together, a shared activity. The creation of language, accord-
ing to the relativist, is a shared decision by a certain community
to see things in a certain way. In this community, objects will
be regarded as existing in the way it has been decided that peo-
ple will refer to them. The attempt to know is seen as a shared
act of creation (Gergen, 1985, p. 270; Gergen, 1986, p. 158). The
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concepts that we use to describe human beings do not refer to
existing entities but may actually create them:
Children are, or become, what they are taken to be by others, and
what they come to take themselves to be, in the course of their
social communication and interaction with others. In this sense,
I take, "child" to be social and historical kind, and therefore also
constructed kind rather than one given, so to speak, by nature in
some fixed or essential form ... such cultural constitution or con-
struction and self-construction, is not simply a matter of reflection
in thought, but also of the whole range of practices, interactions,
and institutions that comprise the social and historical life-world.
(Wartofsky, 1983, p. 190)
Relativists seem to achieve a sense of freedom by their posi-
tion. They are allowed to listen to and respect their inner subjec-
tive voices. But an over emphasis on this ability seems to lead
to an exaggerated sense of freedom, almost total freedom. Indi-
viduals, as relativists, become their own creators, and the only
guidance they use in their new role is their intuition. Bernstein
(1983, p. 18) described the tendency to extreme objectivism as
a response to emphasis paid by the relativists on the private
subjective experience. He called it the "Cartesian Anxiety": "Ei-
ther there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for
our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that
envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos".
Bernstein (1983, p. 9) pointed out that ever since Plato, objec-
tivists have argued that relativism, whenever it is clearly stated,
is self-referentially inconsistent and paradoxical:
For implicitly or explicitly, the relativist claims that his or her
position is true, yet the relativist also insists that since truth is
relative, what is taken as true may also be false. Consequently,
relativism itself may be true and false.
Modern relativists do not seemed impressed by this ancient
argument against their philosophy. They suspect that objec-
tivism is actually motivated by and representative of a private
subjective preference, similar to their own knowledge but with-
out the relativist honesty to admit that. Objectivism is accused
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of offering values and norms in the name of knowledge (See,
for example, Haworth, 1984, pp. 343-357).
One can see how objectivism and relativism developed in
response to each other. The objectivist is responding to the
relativists' emphasis on their private subjective experiences by
proposing fixed universal foundations. Relativists see theories
with claims to universality as threats to their uniqueness:
Why have relativists been unconvinced when objectivists argue,
as they almost invariably do, that relativism is self-referentially in-
consistent, self defeating, and incoherent? Why have objectivists
been unmoved when time and time again it is shown that they
have failed to make the case for the objective foundation for phi-
losophy, knowledge, or language, and that the history of attempts
to reveal such foundations must be judged thus far to be a history
of failures? (Bernstein, 1983, p. 15)
Bernstein (1983, pp. 1-3) thinks that the structuring of the con-
temporary debate on knowledge within the traditional extremes
of objectivism and relativism is happening because of the seduc-
tive power of both of these extremes. Summarizing Gadamer,
Bernstein (1983, p. 37) noted that relativism is not only the di-
alectical antithesis of objectivism, it is itself parasitic upon ob-
jectivism. Both may share the tendency to offer final solutions.
Objectivism in its current manifestation in scientific empiricism
offers a plan for knowledge and with it control over nature and
ourselves. Relativism offers freedom by adherence to one's in-
ner subjective voices, or by emphasizing one's ability to realize
himself the way he chooses.
Richards (1987, pp. 217-224) sees in the philosophy of the
natural and social sciences two dangerous tendencies - to be-
lieve in empirical science as a final authority about knowledge,
or to reject it as relative. Currently, this struggle seems to be in
progress and undecided. Bernstein (1983, p. 49) noted a third
approach: "We are witnessing and participating in a movement
beyond objectivism and relativism".
The Third Approach: The Continuum Theory
In a recent book on methodology for the human sciences,
Polkinghorne (1983, p. 13) wrote:
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All of our knowledge is conditioned knowledge, constructed
within our conceptual systems, and thus knowledge is a commu-
nal achievement and is relative to time and place. One need not
retreat to a complete relativism, however, just because a perspecti-
val or context-bound aspect of knowledge is recognized. Between
the extremes of absolute certainty (with no relativity) and absolute
uncertainty, statements of knowledge can be judged against each
other, and some of them can be accepted and used as the base for
action while others can be rejected.
Beyond objectivism and relativism exists a third approach.
Its proponents accept the relativist rejection of the objectivist's
claim to have a fixed foundation of truth, but, as we saw in the
previous section, proponents of the third approach also accept
the objectivist's criticism about the self-contradictory nature of
relativism - relativism's inability to prove that objective knowl-
edge is unattainable.
Current development in scientific realism, an approach em-
phasizing that scientific concepts have some referential ability
to real entities, seems to belong to the third approach, beyond
objectivism and relativism. McMullin (1984, p. 26) stated that
"the long term success of a scientific theory gives reason to be-
lieve that something like the entities and structure postulated
by the theory actually exists". Leplin, summarizing the basic
theses shared by the new realists, wrote that "The history of at
least the mature sciences shows progressive approximation to
a true account of the physical world". He added to that, "The
(approximate) truth of a scientific theory is the only possible
explanation of its predictive success". Leplin (1984, p. 1) de-
scribed Putnam as having inaugurated a new era of interest in
realism with his declaration that realism is the only philosophy
that does not make the success of science a miracle. One should
note the difference between this version of realism and ortho-
dox objectivism. The new realists do not claim that concepts in
scientific theory represent things as they are, but that concepts
in a successful theory seem to have the ability to refer to things
as they are. What we have is not final truth but some contact
with things as they are.
Modern relativism contends that scientific concepts and the-
ories are just successful tools to manage some reality or to
achieve a practical goal, but do not contain any referential ability
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to true entities. Entirely different concepts may be used to refer
to the same reality at different times. Concepts and what they
refer to are not necessarily related. Levin (1984, pp. 124-139) re-
futed this distinction between the practical and the referential.
He held that it is only because certain scientific concepts and
theories have some referential connection to real entities, or an
ability to relate, represent or express things as they are, that they
can be used as practical tools. Their practicality is embedded in
the extension of their truthfulness.
The new realistic approach to knowledge offers an alterna-
tive, beyond objectivism and relativism. McMullin (1984, p. 35)
clarified the distinction between the new realist and the objec-
tivist or the relativist: "The realist would not use the term 'true'
to describe a good theory. He would suppose that the structure
of the theory gives some insight into the structure of the world".
The objectivist and the relativist differ from the new realist. The
objectivist thinks that a good theory is true or represents things
exactly as they are, while the relativist thinks that the structure
of a theory has to do more with the knower and his culture than
it has to do with the structure of the world.
Another perspective on the connection between a theory
and what it describes which rejects the dichotomy between ob-
jectivism and relativism, is found through hermeneutics, the
study of the methodological principles of interpretation. Bern-
stein (1983, p. 228) quoted Habermas as showing how deeply
embedded the claim to communicate reasonable messages is
in our everyday forms of social life and reproduction, "how
it develops a stubbornly transcending power even when it is
violated and silenced again and again". Objectivity from a her-
meneutical perspective might be the goal we strive for, but are
unable to achieve. We can sense the potential existence of knowl-
edge of things as they are, and by this knowledge be motivated
in an attempt to know, but final knowledge as the objectivist
philosophy describes it is beyond our reach.
The notion that we can get in touch with things as they
are is what motivates attempts to know, what explains our
efforts, what transcends our differences, and what eventually
can explain the successes of some of the theories we regard as
'knowledge'.
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Meehl (1986, p. 322) summarizes the continuous tension be-
tween the objective world and our relative efforts to know it
as it is:
So I begin with the presupposition that the external world is really
there, there is a difference between the world and my view of it,
and the business of science is to get my view in harmony with the
way the world really is to the extent that it possible.
Objective knowledge is the goal and what gives meaning to the
efforts to know, the "extent that it is possible" hints that what
we get is always somewhat less than an objective knowledge,
a product of a subjective mind.
Acknowledgment of the inability to free ourselves com-
pletely from our subjective limitations combined with the goal
to raise ourselves to some contact with the objective led her-
meneutical writers to see our attempts to know as a dialogic
process. They gave language a speculative character - dialogi-
cal attempt between human beings to refer, express, get in touch
and agree upon the nature of some aspects of reality (Bernstein,
expressing Gadamer's ideas, 1983, p. 224). This perspective sees
knowledge as developing in a continuous process. What we
'know' is always one stage in this process. What we know may
be objective for today.
A potential of utilizing subjective mental processes in or-
der to know more intimately the essence of phenomena was
noted in social work by the Adelphi Study Group which sug-
gested adoption of phenomenological methods for the study of
the meaning of subjective experiences (see Vigilante, et al., 1981,
p. 40; for the definition of phenomenology, see Polkinghorne,
1983, p. 296, note No. 9). Phenomenology is a method to in-
vestigate the invariant structure which phenomena may take
as contents of consciousness. Understanding the structure and
meaning of a subjective experience becomes a way to know
things as they are - the attention to the subjective leads to
some objectivity.
Acknowledgment of our limitations to know taken together
with our abilities to achieve some limited certainty are lead-
ing to a narrowing of the targets of inquiry. Popper suggested
that good scientific work is not a search for the "true" theory
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but a process of selection of "better" theories. The process re-
quires creation of many theories and refutation or rejection of
those that are clearly false. The accepted theory is one that was
relatively less falsified than others and this theory itself will
be rejected as soon as another theory is able to stand longer
and holds in more aspects of the test of falsification. The falsi-
fication test requires a very narrow hypothesis. Richards (1987,
p. 55) noted that Popper's philosophy of science, "By making
only limited claims about the world it actually excludes most
of what could possibly occur, and is itself excluded if what it
excludes occurs". D'Andrade (1986, p. 27) reminds us that good
science exists where the scope of the generalizations fits the ex-
tent of regularity found in the phenomena. He suggested that
the social sciences should try to achieve limited generalizations.
We are closer to knowing things as they are when we try
to find universal laws while eliminating claims to universality
from our findings. The efforts to find universal laws are bound
to fail, but it is this process that improves our knowledge about
important contextual regularities. Attempts to find the universal
characteristics of intelligence led the field of intelligence stud-
ies in psychology into a vicious cycle: intelligence was defined
as what intelligence tests measure. Sternberg (1984, pp. 307-
334) wrote that only the metatheory of contextualism has given
research in intelligence the solid grounding that it generally
lacked. In the contextualist view, intelligence is judged with
respect to some context - culture, setting, adaptation needs,
etc. Understanding knowledge as limited in its validity only to
a narrow context, may save its 'objectivity'. It is the attention
to the unique, the limitation, the private, that raises knowledge
from a low subjective state and gives it more contact with things
as they are.
The way to knowledge leads from the objective to the sub-
jective, and from the subjective to the objective. Attempts to
find universal objective laws lead to acknowledgment of the
contextual, subjective nature of our findings. Attention to the
particular contexts in which knowledge seems to be valid gives
it a greater contact with objective reality. Shweder (1986, p. 178)
wrote of the dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity and
proposed a "science of subjectivity":
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The real world, it seems, is populated with subject-dependent
objects and objectlike subjectivity ....... Subjective phenomena
can be studied objectively, and objective study always extends be-
yond the evidence in hand to the unseen and is never free of a
subjective perspective.
Noting the limitations and abilities to achieve objective
knowledge and its interrelatedness with subjectivity is not a
new idea. Some of its roots can be found in Aristotle (Bern-
stein, 1983, p. 38), in the Kantian tradition (Rorty, 1979, p. 163),
and other philosophical traditions. Modern science seems to ex-
press, based on its experience, a new refined understanding of
the limitations and ability to know.
Pragmatism: Methodological Problem Solving
Acknowledgment of the inability to achieve final objective
knowledge of reality and an understanding of human knowl-
edge as a subjective perception of things as they are, raises a
question: how can we distinguish between knowledge state-
ments that are closer to expressing things as they are and those
that are relatively far from reality? Pierce suggested replacing
truth with method: "Truth is whatever is in the end delivered
to the community of inquirers who pursue a certain end in a
certain way" (See, for a short discussion on Pierce's ideas on
methodology, Hacking, 1981, p. 131). What we call truth is just
the best that we can achieve using our methodologies for gen-
erating knowledge.
Lakatos (see Hacking, 1981, pp. 131-132) added an attention
to growth of knowledge as a sign of movement toward greater
contact with the objective. The theory that should be preferred is
the one that generates the growth of new knowledge. A degen-
erating theory is the theory that gradually becomes closed on
itself. One may note that knowledge is understood by Lakatos
as a result of a conscious contextual process. The preferential
theory is not the one that produced the 'final truth', but the one
that continues to develop in explaining new contexts. Knowl-
edge is the product of the specific scientific community. Pierce
and Lakatos, as noted above, do not say if this knowledge is
objective or subjective. This knowledge is a result of an effort to
A Continuum Theory
reach objectivity, within the subjective limits of the specific com-
munity. The concept 'methodology', the study of the methods
used to employ for achieving some end, as explained by Pierce
and Lakatos, can support the continuum view of the relation-
ship between the subjective and the objective. The methods are
designed to give the closest contact with things as they are, but
the methods are our human methods with our limitations.
Emphasis on the methodology that will generate continuous
development of contextual knowledge is replacing the claim
for 'truth'. McMullin (1984, p. 35) wrote that scientists accept
theory, they do not believe it to be true.
Scientists are very uncomfortable at this use of the word 'true',
because it suggests that the theory is definitive in its formulation.
As has often been pointed out the notion of acceptance is very
complex, indeed ambiguous. It is basically a pragmatic notion:
one accepts an explanation as the best one available; one accepts
a theory as a good basis for further research, and so forth.
Understanding knowledge in the continuum between the
subjective and the objective is tied with a change in the mean-
ing of concepts in a scientific theory. Kuhn (1970) emphasized
the centrality of the paradigm, the general conceptual frame-
work of a scientific community, and noted that paradigms are
used as long as they can explain most of the phenomena that
scientists are interested in. Looking at Kuhn's observations from
the objective-subjective interrelatedness perspective, this means
that concepts in scientific theory are neither objective nor subjec-
tive. They are the successful timely subjective ways of a certain
scientific community to relate to the objective.
Motivated by the will to know things as they are, we are try-
ing to find the final causal structure of a relevant phenomenon.
But what we may find, between objectivism and relativism, are
the causal powers - the tendency or potential of certain enti-
ties to be causes. Secord (1986, p. 200) wrote that "the structure
and properties of an entity, under the appropriate conditions,
give it the power or capacity to act in a particular way." Secord
(pp. 202-203) noted that an emphasis on causal powers shifts
the causal focus to the structural natures of entities or processes
with contextual conditions as a background factor.
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In observing the presence of certain causal powers, we may
be in touch with some objectivity. But, we never know the final
causal structure. Holzman (1986, p. 348) wrote that in the social
sciences, as in the natural sciences, we are dealing with relevant
causes, not with necessary or sufficient causes. We may know
that some causes seem to be related to a certain entity. we can
not know if they are always related to this entity or if they are
all the causes that effect this entity.
Between relativism and objectivism, science is seen as a
pragmatic problem-solving activity. Lauden (1977) saw scien-
tific progress as achieved when theories display increasing
problem-solving effectiveness. This increase in problem-solving
effectiveness is what qualifies, according to Lauden, as ratio-
nal. Wimsatt (1986, p. 295) described the heuristic nature of
science. Heuristics are aids for learning, discovery or problem
solving which generate knowledge without claims for its valid-
ity. Heuristics make no guarantees that they will produce any
solution or even a correct solution to a problem, they are cho-
sen because they are pragmatic and parsimonious. Wimsatt saw
science as a combination of learning aids, rules of thumb and
trial and error methods. Mullen (1985, p. 13) may summarize
the trend for us: "Scientific work is reconstructed as a form of
problem solving in which 'satisfying heuristics' are used, princi-
pally for pragmatic reasons of efficiency." The problem-solving
perception of science ties the relative and the objective. Problem
solving scientific theories seem to relate to some objective realty
by responding to a need to solve a problem and by their abil-
ity to offer some solution, to create some change. The problem
solving scientific theories are relative because they can only be
proven able to relate to a specific problem in a specific context.
They are objective and relative for the same reason.
Conclusion: The Continuum Theory
Emerging from this discussion is a theory of knowledge
as a continuum between the poles which objectivist and rela-
tivist philosophies have marked. The continuum theory is based
on an acknowledgment of our inability to achieve final ob-
jective knowledge of reality and an understanding of human
knowledge as a subjective perception of things as they are. The
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continuum theory sees the way to knowledge as leading from
the objective to the subjective: attempts to find universal laws
end in findings which are limited and contextual. But the con-
tinuum also moves from the subjective to the objective pole:
attention to the particular context in which knowledge seems
to be valid gives a greater contact with objective reality.
The continuum theory sees concepts in scientific theory as
neither objective nor subjective. Concepts are the successful sub-
jective ways of certain scientific communities to relate to the
objective at a specific point in time. The subjective and the ob-
jective are also tied together in the continuum theory by its un-
derstanding of 'methodology': methods of acquiring knowledge
are designed to give the closest contact with things as they are,
but the methods themselves are human methods with human
limitations. Emphasis on the methodology that will generate
continuous development of contextual knowledge is suggested
as a replacement for methodologies that claim they will reveal
'truth'.
The continuum theory accepts objectivist attempts to find
the final causal structure of a phenomenon, but only as a way
to find relevant causes, not necessary or sufficient causes. An
emphasis on identifying causal powers, or entities with poten-
tials to be causes, shifts the causal focus toward contextual
conditions.
The continuum theory sees science as a pragmatic problem-
solving activity in which 'satisfying heuristics' are used. The
problem-solving nature of scientific inquiry implies that sci-
entific theories are objective and relative for the same reason.
Scientific theories seem to relate to some objective realty by re-
sponding to a need to solve a problem and by their ability to
offer some solution, to create some change. They are relative
because they can only be proven able to relate to a specific
problem in a specific context.
Implications: The Continuum Theory in Social Work
Some social workers are trying to make the profession an
objectivist science while others stress the relativist ethical and
artistic dimensions. The continuum theory of knowledge, as
existing between the poles of objectivism and relativism, may
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narrow the gap in social work between what is regarded as its
scientific or knowledge side, and what is called its artistic or
value dimension.
Converse (1986, p. 45) noted that each science has its own
"intellectual texture". Each science has its own particular and
subjective way to deal with the objective. D'Andrade (1986,
pp. 29-30) described how different professions work success-
fully with different understandings of science. Adopting an ex-
isting scientific model may not make social work scientific. Nor
is there a necessity to give up the profession's aspiration to be
more scientific. An understanding of its relative and unique sit-
uation may be of more help in the attempt to find what can be
scientific in social work.
Social work knowledge, it seems, will have to include, un-
like, other sciences, more of the relative, ethical and intuitive in
its framework. Frankel (1986, p. 357) indicated a need, in the so-
cial sciences, for consensus based regulative principles that rec-
ommend different methods of knowing for different contexts.
Following this recommendation, we may suggest another un-
derstanding of the knowledge base in social work. It is not just
an accumulation of empirical or theoretical products. It is the
current stage in the process of fitting methods of knowing to
contents of social reality and the accumulated results of this
process. For example, the knowledge base may tell us that the
best way to compare between two existing programs is with
empirical research. This knowledge base may also include a rec-
ommendation to use intuitive methods of knowing as part of a
first attempt to contact a resisting client. It may add that certain
theoretical frameworks were found helpful for conceptualizing
ongoing relationships with clients.
Meehl (1984, p. xiii) described the movement away from
naive objectivism as a process in which theories that were re-
garded as general and universal are not thrown away but seen
as limited to a particular context. Leplin (1984, p. 5) noted that
in the process of scientific development, successful theories of
the past do not completely lose their referential ability but are
incorporated in limited ways into successor theories. The con-
tinuum theory of knowledge implies that there is no place for
the question: which social work practice theory is ultimately
true. No practice theory knows or will know fully the nature
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of human development, psychosocial pathology or helping re-
lationships. We may ask what specific context of human devel-
opment, psychosocial pathology, and helping relationship each
practice theory seems to know well. Or, we may ask which the-
ory seems to know the context that our clients are in or we are
in with them.
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